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Abstract
In 1853, George Bancroft argued that ‘commerce (…) defies every wind, 
outrides every tempest, and invades every zone’. Bancroft portrays trade 
as a forceful activity of defiance, independence and resilience. But if 
trade was as forceful as Bancroft portrays, what kind of world did its 
overwhelming impact create? I argue that, through the entanglements 
of commodity chains, Early Modern trade shaped, and was shaped 
by, extensive global networks and business strategies that created an 
intensive, interconnected world where institutional borders, cultural 
barriers and institutions of empire became irrelevant.
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Rector Magnificus, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, Chair 
of the Institute for History, Your Excellency the Portuguese 
Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, ladies and 
gentlemen,
In 1853, George Bancroft argued that ‘commerce (…) defies 
every wind, outrides every tempest, and invades every zone’.1 
Bancroft portrays trade as a forceful activity of defiance, 
independence and resilience. But if trade was as forceful as 
Bancroft portrays, what kind of world did its overwhelming 
impact create? I argue that, through the entanglements of 
commodity chains, Early Modern trade shaped, and was 
shaped by, extensive global networks and business strategies 
that created an intensive, interconnected world where 
institutional borders, cultural barriers and institutions of 
empire became irrelevant.
1. Commodity Chains, or the showcasing of extensive global 
networks
As an object of study, the Early Modern slave trade, which 
William Wilberforce described as ‘so enormous, so dreadful, so 
irremediable’, is concomitant to themes such as abolition and 
emancipation.2 Beyond the human suffering and individual 
tragedies, however, it has a less personal and more systemic 
meaning in that it was both the beginning and the end of a series 
of commodity chains touching five continents and crossing three 
oceans.3 European traders transported hundreds of thousands of 
enslaved Africans to plantations in the Americas. They funded 
their purchases of slaves by selling low-value products that 
their African counterparts quickly found unsuitable.4 By the 
late seventeenth century, significant amounts of cowrie shells, 
textiles, alcohol and tobacco were being used for systematic 
purchases of slaves on the West Coast of Africa. The shells and 
textiles were imported from the Indian Ocean,5 while alcohol 
and tobacco came from the Americas.6
In the Americas, slaves were sold to three main buyers. Firstly, 
to plantation owners who used them to produce cash crops 
that were shipped to European markets and sold to cover 
the costs of purchasing the slaves, to pay mortgages used to 
acquire the plantations, to repay credit granted for maintaining 
colonial households, and to fund the costs of shipping crops to 
Europe.7 Secondly, slaves were sold as domestics in the growing 
cities of the Americas, where they became symbols of social 
distinction for their masters8, who employed them in their 
households or rented them out for profit. Thirdly, they were 
sold to work in silver and gold mines.9
Most of the silver mined in Spanish America was exported 
to Seville through the Carrera de Indias. However, smaller 
quantities were exported, overland and via the Pacific, 
to Manila, where they entered the Sino-centric world of 
exchanges and partly offset Europe’s trade imbalance with 
China.10 In the Chinese market, the silver was used to purchase 
luxury products that were mainly exported directly to Europe, 
but sometimes to America via the Pacific route. Raw materials 
and manufactured goods, meanwhile, entered the intra-Asian 
networks, some of which passed through or terminated in the 
Indian sub-continent and Indian Ocean, or the place of origin 
of the shells and textiles that were essential for acquiring slaves 
in West Africa.
These commodity chains, explained here from the transatlantic 
slave trade perspective, comprised multiple sub-systems of 
production and exchange of products, people, capital, ideas 
and information in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 
Within this articulated world, it is difficult not to perceive 
historical categories like ‘Atlantic History’, ‘Indian Ocean 
History’ or ‘Pacific History’ as reductive. Being reductive does 
not imply that these categories have no merit - indeed, they 
enable historians to zoom in on specific dynamics of the above 
spaces. However, historians often fail to zoom out into a less 
systemic and more global understanding of the significance of 
the connectivities. These categories are as unhelpful as those of 
‘nationally’ conceptualized spaces such as the British, Dutch, 
French, Portuguese or Spanish Empires. Likewise, smaller units 
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of analysis, such as commercial cycles determining phases of 
colonial expansion (the ‘Pepper Empire’, ‘Sugar Empire’, ‘Gold 
Empire’ or ‘Silver Century’) or modes of economic exploitation 
and colonization (such as the various East India Companies, 
the Royal African Company, among many others), fall short 
in addressing the complexity and connectivity of exchanges 
encapsulated by a more global approach. So how were these 
commodity chains sustained?
2. Secret of business: intensive global interconnectedness
Early Modern commodity chains thrived on individual 
initiative and collective human agency, symbolized by 
networks and characterized by skillful ingenuity. Producers, 
manufacturers, but mostly traders were essential in 
establishing and maintaining these chains. It was their vision 
of the world, often guided by principles of economic, social 
and political gain, that framed and shaped exchanges, fostered 
connections and generated successful symbiotic rather than 
integrated markets.11
In Africa, the transatlantic slave trade was dependent on two 
sets of trading networks: one linking the hinterland (where 
many were enslaved) with the coastal settlements, and one 
maintaining the slaves at the coastal forts and towns while 
they awaited transport across the Atlantic.12 While the former 
mostly comprised Africans from various family groups and 
religious denominations, the latter comprised Eurafricans.13 
These commercial and cultural brokers, middlemen or go-
betweens formed the key between the landed hinterlands 
and the maritime trading routes.14 They also functioned as 
essential bolts in relationships between European traders and 
companies operating on the maritime frontier and the African 
authorities under whose sovereignty these Europeans had to 
trade.15 While hinterland traders focused on local connections 
and on articulating the continental trade, Eurafricans and 
Africans on the coast became essential in connecting local and 
regional networks to transcontinental partners.
The Europeans and Americans trading on the coast, mostly 
from Brazil, belonged to a broader network that articulated 
the African exchanges with those with America, Asia and 
Europe. Bartering slaves for cowrie shells and Indian textiles 
fostered the development of two distinct networks. One group 
of traders operating directly from Europe acquired Indian 
Ocean textiles on the European markets by participating in 
the main East India trading companies’ auctions and shipping 
these textiles to Africa, where they became transaction costs 
associated with the slave trade. Similar networks developed 
across the Arabian Sea and into the Mediterranean for re-
exporting cowrie shells to Africa. The former networks 
departed from Brazil, acquired the textiles in the factories, 
forts and towns of the Portuguese Estado da Índia and shipped 
them across the Cape of Good Hope to Rio de Janeiro and 
Bahia and, from there, to the African markets.16 However, 
these networks faced competition from Indian exporters 
shipping textiles to the East Coast of Africa to fund purchases 
of slaves. East African slaves were sold to buyers in the Arabic 
Peninsula and European settlements in Asia or introduced into 
the Atlantic slave trading system via the Cape of Good Hope.17
The second group of traders operated directly from the 
Americas, selling sugar cane byproducts from Brazil and the 
Caribbean (cachaça and rum) to barter for slaves on African 
markets. Local planters-turned-producers became the business 
partners of regional traders organizing shipments across the 
South Atlantic.18 A similar trend can be seen for tobacco: 
initially, only low-quality tobacco was exported to Africa 
to exchange for slaves. But, like with cachaça, the Brazilian 
traders dominating the trade quickly diversified into low-
quality tobacco to barter for slaves in African markets, and 
high-quality tobacco to be sold to European traders operating 
in these markets and who shipped it to their European home 
ports for sale to European consumers. Tobacco, cachaça, 
cowrie shells and textiles structured trading circuits and 
transcontinental markets, while also framing social hierarchies, 
consumption behaviours and social transformation in Africa.
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In the Americas, slaves were sold at auction or through 
professional brokers19 operating as intermediaries between 
slave traders, plantation owners, city dwellers and mine 
operators. They combined this role with providing credit for 
purchases of slaves, guaranteeing payments for slave traders 
and acting as colonial agents for exports of cash crops and 
raw materials to Europe.20 Simultaneously, brokers within the 
Spanish Monarchy’s sphere also collected duties levied on slave 
trading and, sometimes, were agents of European principals 
holding exclusive slaving contracts and licenses from the 
Monarchy.21 Sporadically, they were also responsible for 
transporting slaves overland or along rivers to mining districts.
The transportation of silver overland to Acapulco was 
organized by local agents, who were responsible for transport, 
security and surveillance until the cargoes were loaded onto 
the galleon departing for Manila. Once there, the silver entered 
the Sino-centric trading complex via exchanges organized by 
the Chinese communities in the Philippines. The silver served 
to balance European purchases in China through Taiwan, 
Macao and Canton.22
American silver taken to China was in direct competition 
with silver received from Japan in exchange for Chinese silk 
and other products. Owing to Japan’s regulated trade, the 
Shogunate was reliant on foreigners such as the Dutch and 
Chinese for its trade with China. However, silver’s availability 
in the Japanese market created profitable opportunities for 
Japanese traders to engage in trade with Chinese and Korean 
networks.23
American silver transferred into China via the Pacific helped 
balance Europe’s trading deficit with China. That deficit 
was only marginally offset by intra-Asian trading networks 
selling raw materials and finished and luxury products into 
the Chinese markets via overland or sea routes. These intra-
Asian networks were operated by Asian trading ‘nations’ 
from multiple cultural and religious backgrounds, both 
autochthonous and diasporic.24 Like Brazilians in the South 
Atlantic or Spanish American agents in the Caribbean, 
what they had in common was the ability to articulate local 
manufacturers, local exchange networks, regional trading 
connections and regional tax farming. These networks 
were essential in building a bridge between textile weavers, 
manufacturers and producers in the interiors of the Indian 
sub-continent and the main maritime gateways, where traders, 
trading companies and Brazilian networks acquired textiles to 
export to European markets as luxury goods, or to barter for 
slaves on the East and West African coasts.25
The people organizing, facilitating and enabling the networks 
that ultimately created these sets of commodity chains had 
varying modus operandi, goals and strategies and displayed 
very different entrepreneurial behaviours. However, two 
features seem common to all: while global trading networks 
developed around the need to connect economic activities 
in the hinterlands with market demand in coastal areas 
and consequently articulated and mediated between local, 
regional and global nodes, agents, networks and markets, in 
what I argue was often a hierarchical connection resulting in 
regional market integration, some network members were 
also linked by horizontal relationships and a degree of self-
organization, inherent to the Early Modern constraints on the 
circulation, transmission and adaptation of information. Local 
and regional networks relied on groups’ social organization, 
including cultural markers such as place of origin, family 
group, language, ethnicity and religion,26 and business was 
conducted among members sharing ‘strong ties’ with family, 
friends and coreligionists.27 Global networks, conversely, 
functioned because local and regional merchants moved 
beyond their shared ‘strong ties’ to establish connections 
outside their socio-cultural environments. These networks, 
therefore, were the result of multiplex relationships of 
individuals linked by what Mark Granovetter called the 
‘strength of weak ties’.28 In short, and following Mark Casson’s 
theoretical premises, global networks were embedded in 
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horizontal relationships based on long-term durability, 
symbiotic relationships between members and their 
intermediation function.29
The simultaneous and mutually enforcing nature of these 
networks at local, regional and global levels, combining 
vertical and horizontal features, has analytical consequences 
for historical narratives. Local merchants in Europe had more 
in common with local merchants in Africa, the Americas, 
China or Japan than with global merchants operating in their 
region. However, this division did not prevent intertwined 
social and economic relationships between these different 
networks. In essence, merchants were organized at three levels: 
vertically, according to zones of production, transformation 
and trade; horizontally, according to levels of participation in 
the integrated networks; and cross-network, according to levels 
of social prominence in a specific community.
Historians have traditionally resolved the problem of the 
limitations imposed on relationships between global merchants 
with widely differing cultural blueprints by arguing for the 
cross-cultural nature of the exchanges between global network 
participants. Since cross-cultural economic exchanges do not 
benefit from the same social regulations as mono-cultural 
exchanges (where group pressure, social shaming or exclusion 
can be used to punish deviant and cheating behaviour), 
they are reliant on cooperation in socially construed spaces 
of trust, such as that provided by the language of merchant 
correspondence and institutionalized agreements (contracts).30 
Only if one or all of these conditions are met can global 
networks operate, across space and time, beyond the cultural 
borders raised by individual social affiliations and identities in 
what Francesca Trivellato poignantly saw as clear evidence for 
the existence of a global mercantile culture.31
My proposal is for an alternative consideration to that of 
Trivellato´s. What if, instead of relying on cooperation and 
the language of trust implicit in mercantile correspondence 
or institutionalized agreements, global merchant networks 
shared a common conceptual framework that developed across 
different continents, at different times and within different 
social, economic, political and cultural constellations, but 
resulted in the conceptualization and acceptance of three 
economic principles? Court records of commercial disputes 
suggest, firstly, that participants in global networks were 
aware of the principle of exchange and thus knew intrinsically 
that reciprocity is expected if a product or object changes 
hands, with cultural differences reflected in the value of the 
exchanged item or the accepted means of payment. Secondly, 
they had a common recognition that if one party in an 
exchange reciprocates less than fully, an imbalance arises and 
compensation becomes necessary, with the cultural divide 
determining whether such debt is a question of free will 
and, thus, a moral issue, or a contingency. The outcome of 
this cultural assessment then frames the means of payment 
and compensation. While some regard payment of principal 
and interest as enough, others see payment of principal and 
delivering one’s extended family into slavery, or honourable 
death through suicide, as the only means of restoring the 
balance inherent in reciprocity. The third common concept 
links directly to the second. Parties failing to reciprocate 
during an exchange and also unable to repay a debt with 
appropriate compensation endanger their reputation and 
become less trusted. And where reputation is associated with 
religious mores, loss of honour is directly concomitant to 
merchant behaviour and morality.
My core argument, based on the universal understanding 
of the essential concepts of exchange, reciprocity, debt/
compensation and reputation, is that merchant culture existed, 
although the enforcing of the values directly associated with 
these essential concepts varied greatly across the cultural 
divide, not only among the Abrahamic religions, but also 
in other religious constellations. Were there no restrictions 
on what cross-cultural global networks sharing a common 
merchant culture could achieve?
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3. Incipiency of Borders, Culture and Empire
Commodity chains structured around the knowledge, 
information and connectivity of global merchant networks 
were not reliant solely on the competence or initiative of 
individual merchants and trading communities. They also 
depended heavily on the institutional framing of spaces 
and spheres of legality that conditioned the way in which 
merchants could organize such chains.32
Spaces and spheres of legality were conceived of and designed 
by states, which then decentralized the enforcement of 
legality to state-like institutions that took on responsibility 
for regulating economic life through jurisdictional taxation, 
control of the borders of territorialized legality with violence, 
mediation of relationships between the state and other polities 
through diplomacy, and for the governance of people within 
the territorialized legal spaces by judicial adjudication. These 
state-like institutions, ranging from the Carreira da Índia and 
Carrera de Indias to the charted and joint stock companies, 
were created specifically for this purpose and have been 
portrayed by historians such as Philip Stern, especially in the 
case of the joint stock companies, as ‘company-states’.33
Competing European states defined legality through two 
premises. On the one hand, the limits of what a state 
considered its right to exploit outside Europe translated 
into the defining and imposing of borders on territories 
that escaped direct control by European states. Not only did 
these borders conflict with existing claims by other European 
counterparts, but also with claims by local polities and states 
in Africa, the Americas and Asia.34 In this sense, Early Modern 
European empire borders were often areas disputed between 
Europeans, but also between Europeans, Africans, Americans 
and Asians.
On the other hand, legality was also defined by rights to access 
and exploit specific resources, and these rights translated into 
territorial or market claims. The exclusive and monopolistic 
rights conceded by European states to royal monopolists and 
to chartered and joint stock companies served three purposes. 
Firstly, they defined the frame within which Europeans 
could compete against each other outside Europe. Secondly, 
they defined economic operators’ exclusive rights to control 
individual European domestic markets, in what historians 
often refer to as mercantilism. Thirdly, they tied specific social 
groups to the state, thus sharing wealth and sovereignty with a 
selected few, described by Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin 
as ‘stakeholders of empire’.35
At first sight, the compartmentalization of areas of trade and 
exclusive rights of exploitation did little to foster commodity 
chains and served as a hindrance to global trading networks. 
However, I propose a more nuanced analysis of the relationship 
between states, institutions of empire and global trading 
networks. At different moments in time these parties opposed, 
cooperated and represented each other, while simultaneously 
and interchangeably articulating legal and illegal circuits and 
moving into spaces of cross-imperial and frontier exchanges to 
transform what Richard White sees as a ‘middle ground’ into 
what I claim was ‘common ground’.36
In the European imagination, the transatlantic slave trade 
was regulated by European monarchs and commercial 
companies. The Spanish asiento de negros and the charters 
of the African and West India companies granted them 
exclusive rights to buy slaves in West Africa and sell them 
on to Caribbean and American markets. While the asiento 
conceded rights to import slaves into the Spanish West 
Indies, the exclusive rights in the charters of the Danish, 
Dutch, English, French and Swedish companies allowed 
them to trade only at their respective forts on the coast and 
to serve their American and Caribbean plantation colonies 
(except where the Dutch, English and French companies 
participated in the outsourcing of the asiento). The sources 
show, however, that Europeans also traded among themselves 
in the same manner as they competed. Ships of different 
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origins and under different flags bought slaves in competitors’ 
forts, while ‘free operators’ were able to facilitate trade for 
institutional and non-institutional traders along the coast. The 
legal boundaries Europeans established against each other 
obviously ignored or set aside institutional controls designed 
by African states, such as the Kingdom of Dahomey or the 
Ashanti Empire, who also saw themselves as controlling the 
same sources of income and commercial routes. Curiously, 
these zones of legality established by Africans and Europeans 
also created opportunities for global networks to participate 
in the illegal trade of enslaved Africans, to use institutional 
loopholes arising when the two institutional worlds met and, 
simultaneously, to engage in legal trade.37
Legal and illegal slave trading into the Americas took 
advantage of the right to introduce enslaved Africans into 
plantation colonies by creating scope for illegal transportation 
of slaves to remote islands in the Caribbean, between the 
different insular and mainland Caribbean settlements and 
towns, and also across two major river systems, the River 
Plate and the Amazon.38 This illegal trade was rooted in the 
acquisition, both legal and illegal, of slaves in West Africa and 
on traders’ willingness and ability to evade taxes on a massive 
scale and thus reduce their transaction costs. Slave traders used 
illicitly acquired products like Indian textiles and Brazilian 
tobacco to pay for slaves, with some tobacco being illegally 
re-exported to Europe and paid for, in part, in smuggled 
goods (silver, cash crops and raw materials) that were then 
reintroduced into the intra-American trading circuits or sold 
into Europe as legal produce. However, perhaps the longest-
lasting consequences of the complementary nature of these 
circuits were the exchanges across the different imperial 
borders.
While the silver circulating in the Americas and the Caribbean 
resulted partly from deviant circuits of exchange, another 
very striking sphere where legal and illegal exchanges 
were intertwined was in Japan. Faced with competition 
from American silver introduced through Manila and the 
increasingly strict rules of Japanese regulated trade, Japanese 
traders often became involved in illegal trade, either by illegally 
purchasing products from the Dutch and the Chinese, or 
by establishing regional import-export operations to Korea, 
Taiwan and Macao in the hope of eluding the bakufu, while 
also being careful, so as to prevent their silver from becoming 
devalued, to avoid trade when Manila-based traders were 
active in the Chinese markets. In this case, the restrictions 
imposed by the bakufu, including the exclusive rights granted 
to the VOC and Chinese traders were, on the one hand, 
disregarded and, on the other hand, shared with the VOC 
and fellow traders through intricate mechanisms of trade and 
credit.39
Another example of where illegality and legality took 
similar shape and followed the same trajectory was 
private trade, where European and Eurasian employees of 
European companies and empires in the East often served 
their employers, while also maintaining private business 
arrangements with local and regional traders. Although this 
private trade was discouraged by all European institutions 
in Asia, it was par for the course ever since Vasco da Gama 
first arrived in Calicut in 1498 and a way to compensate 
employees for low wages and simultaneously buy their loyalty 
at times of crises (including war and naval blockades). Only 
when profits from private trade threatened the position of 
specific individuals or institutions did the latter move to 
punish deviant behaviour or legalize private trade within the 
boundaries set by the institutions.40
The European markets, too, were permeable to illegal trading. 
Even in markets where mercantilism was heavily enforced, 
like England and France, illegal imports, transported by third 
parties, were common. Smaller trading companies, like the 
Swedish, Danish, Ostend or Brandenburg companies, were able 
to introduce their imports into the larger consumption markets 
provided by the British, French and Spanish monarchies and 
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the Dutch Republic.41 These smaller companies, with their 
multinational directors and employees, as well as diasporic 
groups, added value to illicit transactions as they were able to 
resolve disputes in court and argue for property rights based 
on regimes of legal pluralism or regimes of subjection (to a 
specific king or republic).42
Although primary sources do not allow a definitive statement 
on the correlation between legal and illegal global transactions 
during the Early Modern period, these examples stand for a 
generalized behaviour that is simultaneously oppositional, 
cooperative and representative. It is only within the premises 
of entangled history that I can encapsulate the study of 
global trading networks and their relationship with the 
colonial institutional landscape. As the examples attest 
for these network participants, physical, legal and cultural 
institutionalized borders were insipient in influencing the 
trajectory of the commodity chains they commanded. While, 
in this sense, European overseas empires during the Early 
Modern period were violent and exclusive, they were also 
utterly inefficient in enforcing individual, collective and 
institutional borders. Their success can be found, instead, in 
the way European maritime empires were able to include, 
rather than exclude, global merchant networks in their 
operations. This success was twofold.
On the one hand, global merchant networks slowly but steadily 
became stakeholders of empire, and thus their destiny became 
co-dependent on that of the state. While for Europeans this 
often meant a short, quick and guaranteed path up the social 
ladder, for non-Europeans it meant a short path towards 
participating in worlds of trade beyond their culturally defined 
system. As a result, many developed a symbiotic relationship 
with colonial regimes. In this way, the subjects of empire, 
transformed in the nineteenth-century imperial age into 
citizens of empire, were able to enjoy benefits of trade and 
move into institutional positions within the colonial and 
imperial projects.
Although global trading networks defied the borders imagined, 
imposed and weakly enforced by central states and their 
delegated institutions, they did not operate solely on the 
precept of opposing the state, but instead on a sliding scale of 
legality and illegality, depending on whether they were actively 
or passively tolerated by the institutions.
On the other hand, colonial institutions could not have 
enforced their domain without the actions of these global 
networks. Empire’s existence was dependent upon spaces 
of tolerated illegality that simultaneously weakened and 
strengthened the colonial project’s edifice. Thus, Early Modern 
global merchants, turned nineteenth-century citizens of 
empire, become citizens of the world in the postcolonial 
moment.
I conclude with a concrete example of a global, cross-imperial, 
multicultural network that operated legally and illegally, across 
different empires and zones of trade, and that seems to have 
regarded borders, culture and empire as an afterthought in 
its daily activities. Articulated by a European firm, this case 
stands at the centre of an ongoing project with Susana Münch 
Miranda and João Paulo Salvado.
In the early eighteenth century, Jean-Baptiste Cloots, 
merchant and financier in Amsterdam, was by all Early 
Modern standards an extremely wealthy man. He made his 
living by providing financial services to firms in Amsterdam 
and abroad, in three of which he held a special interest. His 
comptoir provided the starting capital for his nephew Paulo 
Cloots and Willem de Bruijn to open a Lisbon office, while 
he also supported his brother, Paulo Jacomo Cloots, who 
had a partnership in Antwerp with Willem’s brother, Daniel 
de Bruijn. In addition, Jean-Baptiste provided services to 
another brother, Egidio Cloots, who opened a comptoir in 
Cadiz. But what were the De Bruijn and Cloots families doing 
across Europe? Paulo Jacomo in Antwerp, in partnership with 
Daniel de Bruijn, managed a successful commercial circuit 
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of luxury and woollen textiles, produced in the Antwerp and 
Amsterdam hinterlands and exported to Iberia. His success 
enabled him to marry into the Antwerp financial family 
De Prêt, who held interests in the European and overseas 
trades. Being in the De Prêt sphere enabled him, in turn, to 
invest in fitting out ships to trade slaves in West Africa, thus 
challenging the exclusive rights of the Dutch and English 
companies. Paulo Jacomo was also prominent in promoting 
an Ostend East India Company under the protection of the 
Habsburg Emperor, a project that proved extremely successful. 
For Paulo Jacomo, the Bengali textiles acquired through the 
Ostend Company were paramount in allowing him to acquire 
enslaved Africans in West Africa, while the tea from Canton 
was introduced, illegally, in England and the Netherlands.43 
In Lisbon, his nephew Paulo Cloots and partner Willem de 
Bruijn quickly abandoned their goal of selling luxury and 
woollen textiles for consumption in the Portuguese cities and 
the Portuguese empire in exchange for imports of wool. They 
saw the potential for profit in the overseas trade and the need 
for financial services in Lisbon, activities that provided better 
and more secure income, and therefore started discounting 
bills of exchange for foreign merchants in Lisbon, via 
Amsterdam and London, using Jean-Baptiste’s networks and 
liquidity. To improve the Lisbon firm’s liquidity, the partners 
then looked for a way to profit from the Brazilian gold cycle 
through the auctioning of the royal contract for exploiting 
tobacco revenues, followed by the right to fit out their own 
ships. This provided the perfect excuse for regularly sending a 
ship with a supercargo to Brazil to exchange textiles and other 
products for gold. Their closeness to the monarchy also gave 
them access to other markets. Like Paulo Jacomo in Antwerp, 
De Bruijn and Cloots participated in the slave trade in West 
Africa and Madagascar, side-stepping the exclusive rights 
and mercantilist policies of the Portuguese and the French 
monarchies, as well as the Dutch VOC and WIC charters. 
They were also able to send ships, within the Lusophone 
world, first to the Estado da Índia, and later to Macao, where 
they gained access to the rich trades of China in a similar 
way to Paulo Jacomo in Antwerp. In Cadiz, Egidio Cloots 
guaranteed the provisioning and fitting out of the Ostend’s 
company ships after they were forced to divert to free ports 
when the British and the Dutch pressured the Emperor to 
liquidate the company. From Cadiz, the ships sailed to China 
and Bengal, with supercargoes and international crews of 
English, Scottish, Irish, Dutch and Portuguese. After the ships 
returned to Cadiz, the Asian products were placed into the 
European markets through free ports such as Hamburg, non-
mercantilist markets such as those in the Dutch Republic, or 
simply through illegal shipments to France and England. At 
the core of these exchanges, Jean-Baptiste provided liquidity to 
his family members and partners, who facilitated Indian textile 
imports’ entry into slave trading circuits in the Indian and 
Atlantic oceans, while profiting from the tea trade and tobacco 
exclusive, especially through tax farming. Along the way, the 
Cloots family sought to profit from the Brazilian gold cycle and 
illicit imports of diamonds from the East and to function as 
‘merchants of souls’, while enrolling crews and supercargoes in 
Cadiz and shaping a global network. This strategy placed them 
in an intensively globalizing and interconnected world, where 
they abided by – as much as broke – institutional, cultural and 
imperial borders across multiple continents and oceans, thus 
rendering these borders irrelevant.
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Gaastra have always put great faith in my abilities. My work 
has been thoroughly discussed by men I greatly respect: Jaap 
Bruijn, Wim Blockmans, Leonard Blussé, Piet Emmer and 
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History Section that I feel most at ease. I dearly miss those 
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elsewhere (Cees, Dirk Jaap, Jurian, Thera and Thomas). It was 
their support, through Marlou Schrover, together with Luuk 
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the Dean of the Faculty and the Board of Directors. It has been 
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Global, the KITLV and the Early Modernists at the Institute. 
Intellectually, I owe much to Yale University (Stuart Schwartz 
and Francesca Trivellato), King’s College London (Francisco 
Bethencourt, Toby Green and Malyn Newitt), the University 
of Oxford (James Belich and John Darwin), and the École des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and Sciences Po (Romain 
Bertrand, Wolfgang Kaiser and Jean-Frédéric Schaub). I have 
shared ideas and friendships, in publications and projects, 
with Ulbe Bosma, Karwan Fatah-Black, Jos Gommans, 
Susana Münch Miranda, Jessica Roitman, Matthias van 
Rossum, Amélia Polónia, João Paulo Salvado, Louis Sicking , 
Filipa Ribeiro da Silva and Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz. In this 
profession, we learn as much as we teach; I am, therefore, most 
grateful to ‘Team Cátia’. We have shared the unexpected loss of 
loved ones, welcomed three beautiful babies and shared fears 
and anxieties. You have brightened my days, kept me sharp 
and protected my sanity. To my students, past and present, 
we have shared personal dilemmas and wonderful academic 
results. Coffee with cookies seems to be the best way to deal 
with both. A word of appreciation for those whose names have 
gone unmentioned: the archivists, especially the most devoted 
professionals at the Amsterdam city archives, the secretary’s 
office, the student advisors, the Institute for History’s 
management team, and staff in the Faculty of Humanities’ 
finance and human resources departments.
My final words go to my family. To my mother, from whom I 
learned that ‘impossible’ is a synonym of ‘lazy’, that ‘obstacle’ 
is only an excuse not to move forward and that ‘working hard’ 
is what most people do. To my dearest and oldest friend, Lena, 
who understands the silence as much as the noise and has 
stood firm with everything I have done over the past thirty 
years. To the Moddermans, who take pride in my work and 
have always greatly appreciated my efforts as a professional, 
as a wife and as a mother. And, lastly, to my boys. Tonco for 
the past nineteen years of impossible decisions, commuting 
over the Atlantic, multiple conferences each year, another 
article, another unstudied source, another book and perhaps 
a wonderful new idea for yet another project. I simply cannot 
imagine what it is to hop into the rollercoaster I have created 
for your life and to still respect my freedom. You have also 
given me the two most important projects of my life. Without 
them, I would certainly have written more papers and probably 
travelled more and, no doubt, submitted more projects, but 
I would not exchange for the world the time I have spent 
with Vasco and Tomé, the Lion and the Bear, building Lego, 
dancing to bad ‘80s music, having target-shooting festivals and 
swimming in the open sea. They remain the only projects that 
really matter.
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Abstract
In 1853, George Bancroft argued that ‘commerce (…) defies every wind, 
outrides every tempest, and invades every zone’. Bancroft portrays trade 
as a forceful activity of defiance, independence and resilience. But if 
trade was as forceful as Bancroft portrays, what kind of world did its 
overwhelming impact create? I argue that, through the entanglements 
of commodity chains, Early Modern trade shaped, and was shaped 
by, extensive global networks and business strategies that created an 
intensive, interconnected world where institutional borders, cultural 
barriers and institutions of empire became irrelevant.
